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AbstrAct
This paper proposes that there exists a specific philosophical 
connection between Nietzsche’s thoughts on tragedy in Birth of 
Tragedy and his thoughts on history in “On the Uses and Disadvantages 
of History for Life.” The paper hopes to enrich one’s appreciation 
of Nietzsche’s early ideas on authentic selfhood by showing the 
relation between Dionysiac ecstasy and unhistorical consciousness. 
A postscript in the last part of the paper examines Philippine folk 
religiosity within the framework of the aforementioned connection 
between Dionysiac ecstasy and unhistorical consciousness.
Keywords: Attic tragedy; Dionysiac; Philippine folk religiosity; 
Socratism; tragic knowledge; unhistorical sense
“In knowledge mankind has a beautiful means of downfall.”
—Nietzsche, Notebook 19 (Writings from the Early Notebooks)
The two works by Nietzsche that are examined in this paper were 
published during his early period. The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music 
was completed in 1872, while the short essay “On the Uses and Disadvantages 
of History for Life” was written in 1874 as a second chapter of a compilation 
of four works from 1873–76 entitled Unfashionable Observations, sometimes 
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called Untimely Meditations.The Birth of Tragedy has received more attention 
from scholars than any of the four works in the Untimely Meditations, and 
there has not been a discussion of this work’s connection to “On the Uses 
and Disadvantages.”1 The goal of this paper, then, is to propose that there 
exists a specific philosophical connection between Nietzsche’s thoughts on 
tragedy in Birth of Tragedy and his thoughts on history in “On the Uses and 
Disadvantages.” Ultimately, the paper aims to enrich one’s appreciation of 
Nietzsche’s early ideas on authentic selfhood. Using his reflections on the 
creative contradiction between Apolline and Dionysiac tendencies and on the 
meaning of unhistorical consciousness, this essay will show that Nietzsche’s 
conception of selfhood is radical, especially when it is viewed against the 
backdrop of western philosophical and scientific tradition up until his time. 
For Nietzsche, the rapturous unity and simultaneous dissolution of the self, 
achieved through its acquiring an unhistorical disposition toward life, is the 
locus of tragic wisdom, which is more valuable and more truthful than any 
other form of truth.2 Although Nietzsche’s critique of traditional philosophical 
views of the self, represented by the Socratic figure, is not novel in the context 
of Nietzsche scholarship, the link that this paper makes between tragic wisdom 
elaborated in The Birth of Tragedy and Nietzsche’s idea of cultivating an 
unhistorical sense of history discussed in “On the Uses and Disadvantages” 
1Even Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins, in their chronological overview of Nietzsche’s 
works in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, make no mention of any direct philosophical or 
ideological connection between The Birth of Tragedy and On the Uses and Disadvantages of History 
for Life. My own research on the topic has revealed no direct scholarly attempt to bridge the ideas 
found in the two works. Robert Pippin uses the contrast between the tragic and Socratic point 
of view in order to examine the works of the 1870s. However, he does not directly propose any 
direct relationship between “tragic wisdom” and “unhistorical consciousness.” See Robert Pippin, 
“Truth and Lies in the Early Nietzsche,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies 11 (1996), accessed May 29, 
2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20717641.
2Nietzsche was not the first and only thinker to contemplate the relevance of “tragedy” in 
fashioning a more meaningful and authentic human life. Some notable thinkers who also dwelled 
on the topic are Schelling, Hölderlin, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Camus, and Heidegger. See 
Julian Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). It is beyond the scope of this exposition to present a comparative analysis of these 
thinkers’ ideas on the topic. Suffice it to say that Nietzsche owed a great debt to Hölderlin and 
Schopenhauer in forming his own ideas on the matter. Nietzsche’s treatment of the concept 
of tragedy in The Birth has proven to be the most seminal especially considering its influence 
on postmodern theories on identity and selfhood. Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Bataille, Deleuze 
and Guattari are all influenced by Nietzsche’s tragic vision of a non-unified or multiple self. 
See Robert Hollinger, Postmodernism and the Social Sciences (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications, 1994), 113–15.
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is a relatively new path of understanding that may open possibilities for 
deepening our appreciation for Nietzsche’s early thought.
An Overview Of the SOcrAtic enterpriSe
The philosophical tradition to which Nietzsche was reacting can be traced 
back to Socrates. Traditionally understood, Socratic wisdom represents the 
veneration of reason that progressively overcomes intellectual and existential 
despair by dialectical logic. The rise of reason as the sole standard for 
metaphysical and moral evaluation was specifically unique to the Greeks 
during Socrates’ and Plato’s time.3 The point of departure was the dictum 
“Know thyself,” that is, willful reflexivity, which then extends the horizons 
of subjectivity and of being itself. Nietzsche remarks, however, that such a 
well-defined and seemingly unobjectionable foundation for judgment perhaps 
conceals some sort of Socratic hubris. He writes:
The sharpest words in favour of that new, unheard-of esteem for knowledge and 
insight were those spoken by Socrates when he said that he was the only man of 
his acquaintance who confessed to knowing nothing; on his critical wanderings 
through Athens, by contrast, when he called on the greatest politicians, orators, 
poets, and artists, he encountered the same illusion of knowledge everywhere. 
He registered with astonishment the fact that all those famous men lacked 
even a secure and correct understanding of their profession, and performed it 
only by instinct. “Only by instinct”: the phrase goes to the heart and centre of 
the Socratic tendency. With these words Socratism condemns existing art and 
existing ethics in equal measure; . . . it sees a lack of insight and the power of 
delusion, and it concludes from this lack that what exists is inwardly wrong 
and objectionable. Socrates believed that he was obliged to correct existence, 
starting from this single point . . . .4
Put another way, the entire Socratic enterprise is grounded upon the forceful 
and violent disintegration of doxa by episteme. For Socrates, unquestioned 
beliefs and customs founded on tradition must be continually and stubbornly 
3See William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1990), 80-81.
4Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond Geuss and 
Ronald Speirs, trans. Ronald Speirs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 65-66. 
Hereafter, this work will be cited as The Birth.
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interrogated by dialectical logic. Socratic wisdom is decisive, incisive, and 
derisive; it confronts life (as we are used to viewing it) with remarkable 
earnestness and purpose, seeking to tame this wily and stubborn beast with 
shackles forged from conscious dialectical reflection. In contrast, the works 
of tragic poets, because derived from divine inspiration, are incapable of 
bringing order to an otherwise disorderly polis. Socrates’s view, expressed in 
the Ion, is that “poetry, that at least which impresses, is produced out of a 
state of ‘Dionysiac ecstasy’ in which the poet is possessed by the gods, by the 
muses in particular. Divine possession bypasses his reason so that he is ‘beside 
himself ’ (553d–535a).”5 From the Socratic perspective, the frenzy and chaos 
present in the works of the tragic poets are communal distractions that seduce 
the citizens away from the one and true activity fit for all human beings—the 
rational contemplation of The Good.
The progeny of the Socratic view is science, which reached an apex in 
the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, as Robert Hollinger explains, was 
an era that strongly advocated the use of instrumental/scientific reason as the 
ground for structuring a rational and thereby just society, a position highly 
indebted to Socratic rationalism.6 For most of the highly regarded intellectuals 
of that era, “Only a society based on science and universal values is truly 
free and rational; only its inhabitants can be happy.”7 The Enlightenment, 
Socratic rationalism’s most distinguished historical offspring, had liberated 
Europe from the medieval shackles of blind adherence to religious dogma; 
however, it had also arguably produced a pale, anesthetized population that 
was spiritually destitute. As Robert Wicks expounds, the prevailing opinion 
was that the contemporary culture was “sick and weak,” that organized 
5Young, 5.
6Robert Hollinger, Postmodernism and the Social Sciences (Thousand Oaks, California: 
Sage Publications, 1994), 7. To further clarify, in the introduction to his edition of The Birth of 
Tragedy, Raymond Geuss explains, “The good man (and, on Socrates’ reading of it, this means 
the man who was leading the good life) was the man who had a certain kind of knowledge. To be 
sure, the ‘knowledge’ the real historical Socrates sought . . . is not exactly scientific knowledge, 
certainly not in the sense that term had come to have by the end of the nineteenth century; it is a 
kind of ‘moral knowledge’, but Nietzsche assumes that there is a distinct, important, historically 
continuous line of development from the Socratic quest to the nineteenth-century ideal of the 
pursuit of objective, scientific knowledge for its own sake. . . . Nietzsche clearly holds that it is 
appropriate to call ‘modern’ nineteenth century culture ‘Socratic’ in the wider sense of being 
essentially devoted to the pursuit and application of propositionally articulated ‘theoretical 
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Christianity was uninspiring, and that increased mechanization contributed 
to the dehumanization of the working class.8
The eventual bureaucratization of the lifeworld and the domination of 
people by the idea of capitalistic progress were initiated by a philosophical 
tradition that compulsively sought to bring rational order to all aspects of 
human life. The price of this order was spiritual malaise—a general population 
that was compelled by reason and conscience to produce optimal results for 
the greater good, but one that was inexplicably world-weary and lost in a world 
that it has fashioned according to the demands of the Socratic vision of the 
good life. This vision may generally be defined as a favoring of the intellectual 
and rational over the instinctive and emotional. The Enlightenment is marked 
as a period of unprecedented advances in technology aimed towards the 
greater rationalization of most aspects of human life. Isaiah Berlin explains:
The rational reorganization of society would put an end to spiritual and 
intellectual confusion, the reign of prejudice and superstition, blind obedience 
to unexamined dogmas, and the stupidities and cruelties of the oppressive 
regimes which such intellectual darkness bred and promoted. All that was 
wanted was the identification of principal human needs and discovery of the 
means of satisfying them.9
The Enlightenment may be viewed as a period of drastic social and cultural 
adjustment. Such developments, however, may be considered as inordinately 
one-dimensional. Since reason becomes the sole measure and purveyor of 
ideas portraying the good life, the Socratic tradition leaves the person bereft 
of alternative grounds for validating and valuing various aspects of human 
existence. Within the context of this Socratic ideal, a person must subdue 
his instincts and allow reason to take charge over one’s life. To fashion 
one’s life in any other way is essentially to succumb to the pull of ignorance 
and indolence.
nietzSche’S reSpOnSe: 
the return tO the DiOnySiAc
For Nietzsche, the progressive colonization of life by scientific/technical 
reason in his time, as perhaps unwittingly precipitated by the Platonic 
8Robert Wicks, Nietzsche (Oxford: One World Publications, 2002), 24–25.
9Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), 4.
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representation of Socrates in the Dialogues, played a crucial role in Europe’s 
cultural bankruptcy in the nineteenth century. Julian Young notes that for 
Nietzsche, “Socrates and Plato saw control, ‘correction,’ of the natural and 
human environment as a goal of overriding importance; that they viewed 
the mytho-poetic thinking of their poet-predecessors as an ineffective way of 
achieving that end; that scientific thinking was the effective alternative; and 
finally that this rationalist view achieved dominance in the fourth century 
BCE, which brought about the demise of the tragic festival as a culturally 
important event.”10 Nietzsche drew inspiration from ancient Greek culture 
(sans Socrates). The Birth of Tragedy is an attempt to challenge the prevailing 
tendencies embedded in Europe’s myopic belief in capitalistic, scientific, and 
technological progress.
Nietzsche brands Socrates as “der theoretische Mensch” (the theoretical 
man). The theoretical man, according to him, is taken over by “a profound 
delusion which f irst appeared in the person of Socrates, namely the 
imperturbable belief that thought, as it follows the thread of causality, reaches 
down into the deepest recesses of being, and that it is capable, not simply of 
understanding existence, but even of correcting it.”11 Such a man assumes that 
being is knowable and controllable, denying both the self ’s finitude and the 
intractability of the world.
For Nietzsche, absolute faith in reason and scientific logic, to the detriment 
of a person’s other instinctive faculties, results in the negation of life itself. 
For him, such “Socratism” can very well be “a sign of decline, of exhaustion, 
of sickness, of the anarchic dissolution of the instincts.”12 No amount of 
rational meticulousness and stringency can negate the simple fact of human 
finitude and the tragic nature of his/her existence in an absurd/opaque 
world.13 The Birth of Tragedy is an invitation to take delight in the tragic 
nature of all existence, of the radical finitude of human powers in the face 
of the great deluge of existence—such is the locus of what Nietzsche called 
tragic knowledge. Nietzsche explains that ultimately, despite all its efforts, 
science, as represented by the theoretical man, inevitably realizes that the 
darkness which shrouds reality/existence is essentially beyond methodical or 
systematic illumination. He writes: “But now . . . science is rushing irresistibly 
to its limits, where the optimism essential to logic collapses. For the periphery 
10Young, 7–8.
11Nietzsche, The Birth, 73. Nietzsche’s italics.
12Ibid., 2.
13William Barrett describes this seemingly futile enterprise of reason rather eloquently in 
Irrational Man, 90.
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of the circle of science has an infinite number of points, and while it is as yet 
impossible to tell how the circle could ever be fully measured, the noble, gifted 
man, even before the mid-course of his life, inevitably reaches that peripheral 
boundary, where he finds himself staring into the ineffable. If he sees here, 
to his dismay, how logic twists around itself and finally bites itself in the tail, 
there dawns a new form of knowledge, tragic knowledge, which needs art as 
both protection and remedy, if we are to bear it.”14
Nietzsche introduces a radically different and, one might argue, a 
diametrically opposed perspective to Socratism—the Dionysiac perspective. 
The Dionysiac, for Nietzsche, represents “intoxicated reality, which has 
just as little regard for the individual, even seeking to annihilate, redeem, 
and release him by imparting a mystical sense of oneness.”15 The Dionysiac 
outlook is grounded upon frenzy, chaos, madness, and intoxication. Unlike 
the theoretical man who takes delight in peeling off layers from the unknown, 
the Dionysiac artist’s eyes “remain fixed on what still remains veiled, even 
after the unveiling.”16 Nietzsche believes that only by reconnecting with 
the mysterious, instinctive, playful, and chaotic nature of reality can we, as 
human beings, be saved from the rigid formalism of Socratic rationalism, a 
position analogous to the stare of the Gorgon vis-à-vis the perpetual flux and 
frenzy of existence. The Heraclitean call to be, to exist, and to create oneself 
in, with, and through the ecstatic flux of nature is Nietzsche’s formula for 
authentic selfhood.17
The Dionysiac is truly un-Socratic; it is not theoretical and it does not 
rest upon an objective, universal, and confident reckoning of being. It is 
14Nietzsche, The Birth, 75. According to Bernd Magnus and Kathleen Higgins, “The Birth of 
Tragedy involves an indictment of contemporary culture as well as an account of the significance 
of tragedy. Contemporary culture’s reliance on reason and its commitment to scientific optimism 
had rendered the modern individual largely oblivious to the Dionysiac character of reality—a 
character which engulfed all individuals in the flow of life but which also rendered everyone 
subject to death and devastation. The repression of vulnerability was psychologically disastrous, 
in Nietzsche’s view” (23–24).
15Nietzsche, The Birth, 19.
16Ibid., 72.
17Nietzsche, in a short work concerning what he termed as the “tragic age of the Greeks,” 
shows his interest and admiration for Heraclitus: “The everlasting and exclusive coming-to-be, 
the impermanence of everything actual, which constantly acts and comes-to-be but never is, 
as Heraclitus teaches it, is a terrible, paralyzing thought. . . . It takes astonishing strength to 
transform this reaction into its opposite, into sublimity and the feeling of blessed astonishment” 
(Friedrich Nietzsche, “Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,” in The Nietzsche Reader, ed. 
Keith Ansell Pearson and Duncan Large [Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006], 108).
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rather a kind of disposition that is achieved momentarily, to be lost again 
and again in the great wave of chaos and frenzy—the ecstasy (Rausch) of 
the Dionysiac. As Nietzsche explains, “This blissful ecstasy which arises 
from the innermost ground of man, indeed of nature itself, whenever this 
breakdown of the principium individuationis occurs, we catch a glimpse of the 
essence of the Dionysiac, which, as they grow in intensity, cause subjectivity to 
vanish to the point of complete self-forgetting . . . .”18 This momentary self-
forgetting signifies one’s entry into the fold of existence. With the dissolution 
of individuation, Socratic knowledge is revealed to be essentially powerless 
against the great tide of existence. The Dionysiac produces and sustains 
the knowledge of historical reality as flux. Jill Marsden explains that, “To 
surrender to becoming may mean to resign the human condition but to do 
so is to realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming—that joy which also 
includes joy in destruction.”19 The joy of destruction represents the dynamic 
fascination of the self that has caught a glimpse of the eternal absurdity of 
existence. Absurdity should not be seen here in a negative light. Absurdity 
implies that life is a blank canvas, a riddle without clues; absurdity is an 
invitation to suffer, a challenge to invent, put simply, a call to live. 
The groundless, coming-to-be of everything in history cannot be fixed 
or arrested by knowledge. As flux, historical reality must not just be studied, 
catalogued, known, or used; one has to live through and within it. This 
Heraclitan coming-to-being cannot be subdued simply by rationalizing the 
flux and projecting an eternal permanence or origin to it. Whereas the Socratic 
perspective would have the poets banished for their Dionysiac tendencies, 
for Nietzsche, the transformation from despondency to astonishment and 
sublimity is achieved intuitively and aesthetically by the explosive combination 
and contradiction of the Apolline and Dionysiac artistic drives realized in 
Attic tragedy. Nietzsche explains:
Their two deities of art, Apollo and Dionysos, provide the starting point for 
our recognition that there exists in the world of the Greeks an enormous 
opposition, both in origin and goals, between the Apolline art of the image-
maker or sculptor (Bildner) and the imageless art of music, which is that of 
Dionysos. These two very different drives (Triebe) exist side by side, mostly in 
open conflict, stimulating and provoking (reizen) one another to give birth to 
ever-new, more vigorous offspring in whom they perpetuate the conflict inherent 
18Nietzsche, The Birth, 17.
19Jill Marsden, After Nietzsche: Notes towards a Philosophy of Ecstasy (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 95. Marsden’s italics.
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in the opposition between them, an opposition only apparently bridged by the 
common term “art”—until eventually, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 
“Will”, they appear paired and, in this pairing, finally engender a work of art 
which is Dionysiac and Apolline in equal measure: Attic tragedy.20
Nietzsche posits that an authentic self is one which has gained momentary 
insight into the mysterious dichotomy of two primal artistic drives in people 
and nature. The Apolline tendency towards measure, harmony, vision, 
and clarity of form rests upon the underlying Dionysiac tendency towards 
intoxication, chaos, frenzy, and formlessness. The two are never alienated 
from each other. The principium individuationis achieved and sustained 
through the Apolline formative drive is always just the temporary result of a 
struggle with the formlessness and primal unity of all existence represented 
by the Dionysiac.
John Sallis defines Dionysiac ecstasy as “abysmal loss of self.”21 This loss 
must not be interpreted in a negative axiological fashion, or as a function of 
existential anguish borne out of psycho-pathological alienation. Selfhood 
from the Dionysiac perspective is a breaching, a crossing of limit; the limit of 
individuation, or as Nietzsche often says, the lifting of the veil of Maya—the 
destruction of illusion.22 Absolute rational self-possession is transgressed and 
20Nietzsche, The Birth, 14.
21John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991), 56. The full explanation is as follows: “For in its character as ecstasy the Dionysiac 
state/impulse is excess itself, excess as such, the very moment of exceeding; or, more precisely, 
the Dionysiac is what one would call excess itself, excess as such, were not the excess such as to 
disrupt the very operation of such delimitation as would be presupposed by the as such, by the 
itself—hence, again, the need for a crossing of saying with unsaying. In reference to the self, the 
Dionysiac is the exceeding of the limit by which the self would be defined and constituted as an 
interior space of self-possession. Such exceeding is such a disruption of determinate selfhood, a 
certain loss of self—let it be called: an abysmal loss of self. It is thus that Nietzsche repeatedly 
relates the Dionysiac to terror, dread, suffering (Schrecken, Entsetzlichkeit, Leiden). It is not that 
the Dionysiac produces or discloses terror, dread, suffering; rather, the Dionysiac is to the utmost 
extent that loss of self, of self-possession and measure, that one undergoes in various degrees and 
connections when one is struck with terror, or overcome with suffering. And yet, the logic of the 
Dionysiac, the logic of the dual, is such as to intertwine such loss with the joy, the jubilation, the 
pleasure of transgressive reunion” (italics in original).
22It is interesting that Nietzsche’s insights on the Apolline/Dionysiac polarity somewhat 
find an analogue in Asian thought. If the Apolline aspect of existence is associated with light 
and the Dionysiac with darkness, the famous diagram of the Chinese forces yin and yang comes 
to mind “in which the light and the dark lie down beside each other within the same circle, the 
dark area penetrated by a spot of light and the light by a spot of dark, to symbolize that each must 
borrow from the other, that the light has need of the dark, and conversely, in order for either 
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the delimitation of personality granted by the principium indivituationis is 
exceeded by the ecstatic reunion of people with other people, with nature, 
with himself, with the abyss itself. As Nietzsche says:
Not only is the bond between human beings renewed by the magic of the 
Dionysiac, but nature, alienated, inimical, or subjugated, celebrates once more 
her festival of reconciliation with her lost son, humankind. . . . Now the slave 
is a free man, now all the rigid, hostile barriers, which necessity, caprice, or 
“impudent fashion” have established between human beings, break asunder. 
Now, hearing this gospel of universal harmony, each person feels himself to be 
not simply united, reconciled or merged with his neighbour, but quite literally 
one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds 
of it flutter before the mysterious primordial unity (das Ur-Eine). Singing and 
dancing, man expresses his sense of belonging to a higher community; he has 
forgotten how to walk and talk and is on the brink of flying and dancing, up 
and away into the air above. . . . Just as the animals now talk and the earth 
gives milk and honey, there now sounds out from within man something 
supernatural: he feels himself to be a god, he himself now moves in such ecstasy 
and sublimity as once he saw the gods move in his dreams. Man is no longer 
an artist, he has become a work of art: all nature’s artistic power reveals itself 
here, amidst shivers of intoxication, to the highest, most blissful satisfaction of 
the primordial unity.23
In other words, the dissolution of self, which happens in Dionysiac revelry 
and intoxication, is the portal through which the human being is granted 
access to face the abyss of being. For Nietzsche, exposure and physiological 
commitment to the tragic nature of existence as revealed by Attic tragedy, 
exemplified by the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles, bring people face to face 
with the finite and absurd reality of temporality. The Dionysiac worldview 
exalts the irrefutable permanence of flux and chaos. Dionysiac ecstasy is, 
therefore, the gateway towards tragic wisdom.
For Nietzsche, the dithyramb or Dionysiac lyric poetry grants Attic 
tragedy with its most powerfully penetrating gaze into the abyss. It is in the 
Dionysiac satyr-chorus where “man is stimulated to the highest intensification 
to be complete” (Irrational Man, 83). Although there are contextual differences between these 
two images, it might be helpful for those interested in writing about Nietzsche’s influence in 
Asian thought and vice-versa. Graham Parkes’s edited collection on the subject might help open 
possibilities of research in this area: Nietzsche and Asian Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991).
23Nietzsche, The Birth, 18.
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of his symbolic powers; something that he has never felt before urgently 
demands to be expressed: the destruction of the veil of maya, one-ness as the 
genius of humankind, indeed of nature itself.”24 In Attic tragedy, the artistic, 
lyrical and ecstatic convulsions of the chorus expose man to the abyss, where 
he is consumed, destroyed, and in the end, renewed. Through the intoxicated 
frenzy and mystical union with being reached through ecstatic existence, man 
is exposed not just to the horrifying void, but to the sublime. Nietzsche explains 
that just when one is at the brink of effacement by ontological resignation after 
experiencing the abyss, “Here, at this moment of supreme danger for the will, 
art approaches as a saving sorceress with the power to heal. Art alone can re-
direct those repulsive thoughts about the terrible or absurd nature of existence 
into representations with which man can live; these representations are the 
sublime, whereby the terrible is tamed by artistic means and the comical, 
whereby disgust at absurdity is discharged by artistic means.”25
Through art, the incomprehensibility of the absurd is transformed into 
the sublime. The lyric poetry of Attic tragedy exposes the primordial “evil” of 
individuation (Socratic objectivity and conceptual clarity) and salvages human 
history from the temptation of nihilistic resignation by restoring people’s 
oneness with life. In other words, tragedy shows people that it is only by losing 
themselves in the ecstasy of Dionysiac sublimation that they can begin to face 
the horror of existence with a smile—the smile that Sisyphus used to become 
one with his rock, consequently transforming his ontological burden into 
audacious levity. The fetters of Socratic obsession with knowledge, which once 
shackled and bounded Sisyphus and Prometheus to their respective fates, are 
destroyed by the ecstatic intoxication of the Dionysiac that delivers one back 
to primal oneness with the gravitational field of tragic existence.
the trAgic AnD unhiStOricAl hiStOry
In “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” Nietzsche 
provides a way of understanding the relationship between human existence 
and history. He believes that history must not be viewed in an objective 
manner as a chronology of monumental events or a repository of everything 
that is antique. Against the academic, scientific, and historiographical attitude 
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that history must also be dealt with unhistorically. An unhistorical sense 
of history is a kind of happy forgetfulness that tempers the weight of the 
responsibility of memory. He writes:
The unhistorical is like an atmosphere within which alone life can germinate 
and with the destruction of which it must vanish. It is true that only by 
imposing limits on this unhistorical element by thinking, reflecting, comparing, 
distinguishing, drawing conclusions, only through the appearance within that 
encompassing cloud of a vivid flash of light—thus only through the power of 
employing the past for the purposes of life and of again introducing into history 
that which has been gone and is done—did man become man: but with an 
excess of history man again ceases to exist, and without that envelope of the 
unhistorical he would never have begun or dared to begin.26
The unhistorical disposition emboldens man to act freely, as the burden of the 
past is momentarily lifted from his shoulders. It does not deny the relevance of 
the past but suspends this in light of the possibilities harbored by the present. 
People’s historical consciousness, their calculated reckoning of possibilities 
for the future circumscribed by what has been must be tempered and even 
overridden by the child-like disposition of the unhistorical sense that acts 
without deliberation—a transcendence of the ensnarement of consequence 
through blind and reckless abandon.27
Nietzsche thought that it was the Greeks, specifically those who were 
exposed to Attic tragedy, who were able to keep “a tenacious hold on their 
unhistorical sense.”28 Their sense of the tragic allowed them to give in and 
revel in the horrifying momentum of history. Instead of seeking sense in 
the procession of random events in history, the tragic Greeks heroically 
stood their ground and allowed themselves to be swept away by the tides 
of fate (Moira). With a diminished historical sense, people can afford 
more room for an unhistorical capacity to embrace the abysmal truth of 
existence. This is what allows them to artistically create the meaning of their 
lives, transcending the “moral” lessons of the past and gleefully projecting 
themselves into the ether.
26Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in Untimely 
Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 63–64. Hereafter, this work will be cited as “On the Uses.”
27Peter Berkowitz, “Nietzsche’s Ethics of History,” The Review of Politics 56, no. 1 (Winter 
1994), accessed March 23, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable /1407565.
28Nietzsche, “On the Uses,” 79.
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An excess of historical sense results in ossification and decline. An excess 
of historical sense transforms the human person into a passive receptacle of 
retrospective and romantic ideals that prematurely circumscribes and measures 
his every thought and his every act. The past, after all, is the foundation of 
conscience. The past is the wise and oftentimes vindictive counsel of the 
present that warns it against the travails of both repetition and originality. An 
obsessive preoccupation with the past shackles the human person and paralyzes 
him, petrifying his otherwise vivacious corporeal and spiritual existence.29
It is by acquiring what Nietzsche termed as a “suprahistorical vantage 
point” that people can overcome the temptation to romanticize the past, begin 
to discover historical possibilities for the future, and be delivered from the 
clutches of the lamentable idealization of what has been, to the atmosphere of 
historical creative possibilities. The suprahistorical perspective sees through 
historical events and is able to intuit the eternal recurrences that ground the 
narrative of history. Nietzsche explains, “With the word ‘the unhistorical’ I 
designate the art and power of forgetting and of enclosing oneself within a 
bounded horizon; I call ‘suprahistorical’ the powers which lead the eye away 
from becoming towards that which bestows upon existence the character of 
the eternal and stable, towards art and religion.”30
We may speculate that the suprahistorical man is Nietzsche’s early term 
for the overman—the man that has gained insight and has accepted the 
eternal recurrence of the same. The suprahistorical man is a descendant of 
Heraclitus—a man who recognizes the flux of existence that destroys and 
creates from the abyss. He undercuts the moralizing power of the historical 
sense and lays bare the tragic character of time, that is, its eternally absurd 
nature. Instead of fixating his eyes on the idol-worship of monumental history 
or languishing in the romantic idealization of the past by antiquarian history, 
Nietzsche says that the suprahistorical man criticizes history and “sees no 
29Ibid., 102.
30Ibid., 120. Berkowitz illumines this point further: “Accordingly, great deeds—every 
beautiful work of art, glorious battlefield victory, and passionate love—require a studied ignorance, 
a self-imposed blindness to obligations and dangers (UD 1, p. 64). But a few rare individuals, 
Nietzsche anticipates, will rise to a ‘suprahistorical vantage point’ [ühistorischen Standpunkt] from 
which they will discern ‘the essential condition of all happenings—this blindness and injustice 
in the soul of him who acts . . .’ (UD 1, p. 65). The ‘suprahistorical man’ [überhistorischen 
Menschen] suffers nausea as a result of his correct perception that history is a meaningless series of 
equally valueless moments. Contrary to the historical man who is deluded about the ‘meaning of 
existence,’ the suprahistorical man knows that existence rules out salvation, and that despite the 
great variety in the history of nations and individuals, existence is always the same, a perennial 
flux devoid of intrinsic significance” (13–14).
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salvation in the process and [is one] for whom, rather, the world is complete 
and reaches its finality at each and every moment.”31 Suprahistorical man, 
therefore, is also the son of Dionysos.
Instead of saturating people with historical facts and calculating the 
incipient possibilities in our present acts, the suprahistorical vantage point 
challenges humanity to live without restraint and engage in a “forgetful” 
reckoning of history. For Nietzsche, the ecstatic fluidity of the absurd harbors 
a greater truth than the idealizing and arrogant musings of a philosophical 
malcontent. This truth, however, is not found in the incisive method of 
the historian; it is a truth analogous to the erratic melody of lyric poetry, 
perpetually transforming its non-imagery in every repetition. Suprahistorical 
man has “the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform 
and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to 
replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds.”32 Nietzsche envisions 
the suprahistorical man as someone who lives dangerously, unfettered by the 
measure of the past and liberated from the pangs of conscience. He is indeed 
someone who has transcended the linear character of history and allowed 
himself to be absorbed, dissolved and recreated by the abyss.
Nietzsche, however, does not discount the value of historical sense. In fact, 
he says that, “The unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure 
for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture.”33 For Nietzsche, the 
suprahistorical standpoint represents the transgression of the delimitation of 
historical sense by the unhistorical sense. This movement provides the human 
being with a springboard towards authentic ecstatic existence. Although the 
Apolline drive towards form, stability, and clarity is an indispensable tool 
in schematizing the projected path of history, in the end, the will to destroy 
and to lose oneself in the ecstatic frenzy of the absurd is still the wellspring 
of abysmal truth. The march of history, its dialectical progression, is only a 
moment, a freeze-frame, a snapshot of an otherwise fluctuating, erratic and 
absurd recurrence of being.
The unhistorical sense provides suprahistorical man relief from the 
delimiting and circumspecting tendencies of the historical sense. In this state 
of absolution and convulsion, this person realizes and experiences freedom 
and releases the creative capacity to love, that is, to produce an original act 
of kindness towards the absurd by way of positive joyful acceptance. It is not 
31Nietzsche, “On the Uses,” 66.
32Ibid., 62.
33Ibid., 63. Nietzsche’s italics.
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acceptance borne of ressentiment or disappointment, but a creative acceptance 
generated by the ecstatic union of the self with the tragic wisdom proffered by 
the abyss and chaos of history. It is equivalent to the tragic insight found in 
Attic tragedy, a knowledge that can transcend the illusion of boundaries and 
individuation towards the joyful recognition and acceptance of the absurdity 
of existence and one’s union with it.
cOncluSiOn: trAgeDy, ecStASy, AnD hiStOry
Nietzsche constructed a f luid and dynamic version of authentic 
personhood. While the momentum of the Socratic imperative of self-reflexivity 
and order brought the Enlightenment scientific and technological progress, 
it had also arguably petrified the spiritual vitality and ecstasy latent in the 
individual’s organic bond with life and every joy and horror that constitutes 
it. Reason does not fully define the human being. Against the pervading 
rationalism of his time, it may therefore be argued that Nietzsche’s ideas 
pertaining to selfhood and its relation to tragedy and history are indeed both 
radical and revolutionary.
This call for continual self-renewal and creative recreation is, for me, the 
prominent theme of The Birth of Tragedy and “On the Uses and Disadvantages 
of History for Life.” Instead of allowing the timeless monuments of the 
past to define the present, Nietzsche, through these works, and the ensuing 
philosophical tradition which followed and owed a great debt to him 
(existentialism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism), paved the way for a 
revolutionary change in the way human beings would understand themselves 
in relation to history and to life. The ecstatic joy of realizing and accepting 
one’s finitude in the face of the tragic far outweighs the salvific promise of 
dialectical reason.
Nietzsche’s untimely ideas concerning authentic selfhood are grounded 
upon the abyss. Tragic wisdom consists in the obliterating rapture of Dionysiac 
ecstasy that energetically resists and overcomes the individuating and clarifying 
tendency of Apolline representation. Tongue in cheek, the Dionysiac man 
willfully and joyfully submits himself to the formlessness of union and loses 
himself in the eternal whirl of absurd existence. In this sense, one can argue 
that Socrates was more modern than Nietzsche. Socratic wisdom is nothing 
but the persistent claim of fortification of a ground in the “I,” which rejects the 
illusory flux of vital and formless being. Nietzsche, on the other hand, believes 
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in the inalienable and transformative power of subjective dismemberment 
that seeks wisdom not from an individuated and idealized self, but from the 
mystical and musical union with the All. In the musical convulsions of the 
chorus in Attic tragedy, Nietzsche establishes an original and seminal locus 
for selfhood. Dionysiac lyric poetry liberates people from the unnecessary 
preoccupations of egocentric mindfulness and gratuitously throws him into 
the fray, to be torn apart, extinguished and, in the end, transformed by tragic 
wisdom. Nietzsche’s early ideas reveal modernity’s obsessive preoccupation 
with measure, control and individuation as essentially the by-products of a 
tradition that sought to alienate persons from the truth of tragic existence. 
For Nietzsche, a deeper truth is revealed in Attic tragedy of which Socratic 
logic remains oblivious.
The delight in the destruction of the individual that occurs in tragedy 
transcends the axiological polarity of emotions and morality and brings people 
to the threshold of an intuitive and unmediated insight into the mystery of 
life. Greek tragedy exposes the radical unity and likeness of all when viewed 
within the horizon of the f lux and the absurd. Dionysiac wisdom shows 
people that life is indeed worth living, not because it is a portal towards 
salvation or a “better life,” but because and only because people have no 
other choice but to live, suffer, laugh, and die in life. Through the artistic 
mediation of the artist (the lyric poet, the tragic playwright), this terrifying 
fate is transformed into a profound insight into the sublime, where life and 
death, joy and suffering are revealed to be nothing but temporal fluctuations 
in the eternal sea of history.
It is in this context where Nietzsche challenges us to suprahistorically 
arrive at tragic insight by unhistorically forgetting ourselves, our individuality 
in the ecstatic rapture of the Dionysiac. By exceeding the limits of history 
projected by the past to the present, rendering it predictable and progressive, 
the suprahistorical standpoint rebukes the romanticized expectations 
of what has been by forgetting history. In this childlike state of amoral 
forgetfulness, the self is allowed to play, that is, to reckon its possibilities in 
its own terms. Unburdened and unfettered by the wisdom of the antiquarian 
and monumental greatness of the ancients, the self is afforded full rein to 
its being as it dives into the abyss—the only place where it can see itself for 
what it truly is.
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pOStScript: nietzSche, the fieStA, AnD 
philippine fOlk religiOSity
What might Nietzsche’s views of authentic selfhood grounded in 
Dionysiac ecstasy and unhistorical history illumine for us in the Philippines 
in the twenty-first century? Filipinos are undeniably religious. Roughly 85 
percent of the Philippine population is Roman Catholic.34 This is, of course, 
mainly due to the three hundred year history of Spanish colonial rule over the 
islands. One of the most recognized expressions of this religious tradition is 
the fiesta. These jovial and colorful celebrations, however, were not originally 
part of Spanish colonization tactics, but were a strategic re-appropriation of 
pre-colonial practices of the natives. According to Hornedo, the Spanish 
missionaries “recognized the value of syncretic use of the native love for 
festification, and they instituted a plethora of religious fiestas to rival and 
eventually replace many of the indigenous ones.”35 Almost half a century after, 
the fiesta is still one of the most novel and impressive displays of Filipino folk 
religiosity.36 From the famous Ati-Atihan festivities of Aklan to the equally 
renowned Moriones of Marinduque, all year round, fiestas are celebrated in 
literally every barangay of the archipelago.37 Apart from being an expression 
of fervent religiosity, these festivities are also events that showcase the 
people’s inimitable passion for corybantic and sometimes, seemingly senseless 
celebration. Philippine folk religiosity, as exhibited in the fiesta, is permeated 
34Florentino Hornedo, Culture and Community in the Philippine Fiesta and Other Celebrations 
(Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing, 2000), 5.
35Ibid., 3.
36Nick Joaquin provides a helpful way of situating the meaning of folk religiosity in the 
Philippines. In Culture and History, he writes: “Too much nonsense has been said about Catholics 
being passive in worship. In the West maybe; but not here in the Philippines, where our style 
of worship, on the contrary, approaches the extravagant. We chant or sob our prayers out loud; 
we walk on our knees; we dance in church; we carry holy images on our shoulders in howling 
procession; we flog ourselves on Good Friday. Outsiders to our culture find our style of worship 
distasteful and conclude that we don’t ‘understand’ Christianity or true religion. Do they? Can 
Christianity, can religion, really be reduced to pure and simple ethics—to living by God’s word, 
to doing and being good? That was the Puritan ideal—and we know how sick the Puritans ended 
up. Their mistake was in thinking, being no friends of exuberance, that they could reduce religion 
to its most common denominator and could take the thu out of enthusiasm, being too austere to 
care for a word that unites divinity and frenzy, though it perfectly expresses the religious impulse 
in man” (Culture and History [Pasig: Anvil Publishing, 2004], 105).
37Other notable Philippine fiestas are of the Black Nazarene in Manila, Santo Niño in Cebu, 
San Isidro Labrador in Quezon, Mother of Peace and Good Voyage in Antipolo, Santa Clara in 
Bulacan, Peñafrancia in Bicol, and Manaoag in Pangasinan.
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with mystical, or, as I shall try to show, Dionysiac elements that may grant us 
a way of examining the phenomenon through Nietzschean lenses.
The fiesta is an exhibition of communal hysteria, as online footage of the 
annual January 9 celebration of the feast of the Black Nazarene in Manila 
attests. As the culminating event of the pistang Quiapo, the procession, or 
the translación, of the statue of the Black Nazarene draws a million or so 
devotees. The streets of Manila are flooded by men, women, and children, all 
praying, crying, and screaming barefoot, as they try to wipe with any piece 
of cloth or garment (mostly small towels) any part of the ándas (the transport 
chariot) bearing the two-hundred-year-old statue known to be miraculous. 
Apart from the obvious physical and psychological traumas that devotees are 
prone to suffer within the chaos of the fanatical crowd, some people actually 
die of extreme fatigue or of heart attack amid the frenzy of the procession. 
Aguinaldo provides a vivid description of the feast: “The fervor that only 
Quiapo feast yield[s] is also manifested by the bright lights that add glitter 
to the Quiapo church and the huge stage traditionally built in Plaza Miranda 
nine days before the feast. Add the familiar lines of sampaguita vendors, 
sweepstakes vendors, peanut vendors, herbs vendors, anything-that-can-be 
vendors, fortune tellers, cry-for-hires, howlers, lovers, pickpockets, students, 
employees, professionals, housewives, housemaids, and many more faces of 
life and one can have a complete picture of the sea of humanity. The buntings 
too, and the mini flag—like multicolored paper of all sorts[—]cannot escape 
observant eyes.”38
From an outsider’s point of view, the whole phenomenon appears almost 
like an act of nature—a swarm of bodies, swaying in all directions, its 
movement similar to a typhoon wreaking havoc on everything in its path 
as it snakes its way through the narrow streets of the city. The atmosphere is 
replicated at other major fiestas in the Philippines. Alejandro Roces describes 
the festivities of the Ati-Atihan in Aklan as an entire mass of humanity 
“running mad for its own sake.”39 He adds further, “The Ati-Atihan is an 
audience-participation festivity. And no one remains a spectator long. You 
don’t see an Ati-Atihan; you experience it; you are part of it. Like a maelstrom, 
it sucks everything into its vortex.”40 Similarly, Ma. Jovita Zarate’s study on 
the feast of San Clemente in Angono, Rizal, and Respeto’s research on the 
38M. M. Aguinaldo, A Study on Filipino Culture: The Devotion to the Black Nazarene of Quiapo 
(Quezon City: MMA Publishing, 2002), 6.
39Alejandro Roces, Fiesta (Hong Kong: Vera-Reyes and Toppan Printing Ltd., 1980), 243.
40Ibid., 243–45.
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Turumba of the feast of the Virgin of Sorrows in Pakil, Laguna illustrate 
how the chaos and frenzy of religious fiestas dramatically affect the inward 
and outward dispositions of those taking part in the celebrations. Zarate 
describes her own experience of joining the fluvial festivities of San Clemente 
as terrifyingly unnerving because of the sheer density and frenzy of the people 
in the procession.41 Respeto likewise observes this theme of frenzied delirium 
in his work on the Turumba in Laguna.42
Bracketing the obvious sociological, anthropological, and theological 
presuppositions and implications of these phenomena, it might be interesting 
to see whether Nietzsche’s reflection on the Dionysiac elements found in 
Attic tragedy can serve as a novel framework for interpreting Philippine folk 
religiosity exhibited in fiestas. Given the multi-dimensional possibilities for 
interpretation latent in the fiesta and folk religiosity, it may be presumed 
that theologians, sociologists, and social psychologists have done their part 
in studying the hermeneutic implications of these events in their respective 
fields. A philosophical (Nietzschean) perspective on the matter may harbor 
41What follows is Zarate’s personal account of the experience in Angono, Rizal: “Kagulo ang 
lahat. Taong 2009 nang una akong sumama sa prusisyon  at  wala  pa  akong masyadong inaasahan 
sa magaganap sa prusisyon ng pagoda. . . . Napahiwalay ako sa mga kakilala, at napadikit sa mga 
lalaking lasing na, kahit pa alas siyete pa lamang ng umaga. Hindi ako makalipat ng posisyon 
dahil lubhang masikip na, balikat sa balikat ang mga tao, wika nga’y hindi na mahulugan ng 
karayom ang paligid. Nakakatakot dahil isang pagkakamali lamang—isang masamang loob na 
mangugulo o isang paputok na babagsak sa mga tao, ay tiyak na magkakaroon ng stampede at 
may masasaktan. Napaghalata ng mga lasing na kinakabahan ako at tila natatakot sa kanilang 
amoy-alak na gayong kasisikat pa lang ng araw. ‘Ate, ayos lang iyan’” (“Patron ng Biyaya: Ang 
Prusisyon sa Pagoda para kay San Clemente sa Angono, Rizal,” in A Reader in Philippine Theater: 
History and Criticism, ed. Jonathan Chua and Rosario Cruz-Lucero [Quezon City: University of 
the Philippines Press, 2014], 125–26).
42Respeto, in an interview with Iñigo Vito, discovered that the word “turumba” traces its roots 
from the Spanish “tarum,” which means being possessed (sinasapian) or being delirious (nagdedeliryo). 
He provides a description of the procession itself: “Hindi na nagaganap sa kasalukuyan ang anumang 
pagdedeliryo o karahasan sa Turumba. Sa prusisyon, ipinapahayag nang mga deboto ang kanilang 
pananampalataya sa pamamagitan ng pagkanta, pagsayaw, pagpalakpak, at pagtalon. May mga 
pagkakataon ng isinasayaw ng mga kabataan sa Turumba ang nauusong sayaw na napapanood nila 
sa telebisyon. Katangian din ng Turumba ang pagkakaroon ng ispektakulo, gaya ng paghahanda ng 
magarbong korona ng Birhen, makukulay na damit ng mga santo, at pag-aadorno sa may pilak na 
andas. Dito isinasakay ang birhen upang iprusisyon habang isinasayaw at ipinapaling-paling sa iba’t 
ibang direksyon. Nagmimistulang isang karnabal din minsan ang prusisyon dahil sa kinaugaliang 
kalsa, kung saan masasaksihan ang pamumusó ng ng mga lalaking nagdadamit sanggol, buntis, at 
mangkukulam” (“Ang Pagtatanghal ng mga Banal na Gawain sa mga Topograpiya ng Bayan ng 
Pakil,” in A Reader in Philippine Theater: History and Criticism, ed. Jonathan Chua and Rosario 
Cruz-Lucero [Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2014], 141–42).
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new possibilities for interpretation. It may seem odd at first that Nietzsche, a 
thinker most famous for the line, “God is dead,” could be useful in reflecting 
on the Filipino’s enthusiasm for religious festivals. A qualification is therefore 
in order. To use Nietzsche as a probe for folk religiosity necessitates that 
prospective research must make it clear at the outset that it shall limit its use of 
Nietzschean literature to two of the main ideas explored in this paper, namely, 
Dionysiac ecstasy and unhistorical consciousness. To refer to his later ideas 
concerning “slave morality” to say that Philippine folk religiosity represents a 
people’s blind and cowardly obedience to religious dogma would be to miss 
the point of the endeavor.
Almost all scholarly accounts pertaining to Philippine folk religiosity 
emphasize the frenzied chaos that rules over the crowd during the religious 
festivals that accompany the fiesta. Most of the personal accounts gathered 
from the participants show that it is the person’s devotion to God that 
drives him to risk life and limb in the parades. Some are motivated by 
desperation (hoping for a miracle), while some are merely observing tradition. 
Notwithstanding the differences in motivation, once a person jumps into 
the crowd, his personal identity vanishes. The chaotic embrace of sweaty 
and painted bodies absorbs and negates both agency and memory. Asked 
to explain how they are able to endure being in the crowd, people who join 
these festivals often reply that they cannot. One participant at the Quiapo 
fiesta said, “Hindi ko rin alam. Basta noong nandoon ako, lumalakas ako.”43 
This seemingly mystical union with both the sacred (the mystical figure of 
the saint) and the profane (the almost inhumane physical torture of being 
in the crowd) that participants experience in religious processions like the 
traslación is similar to Dionysiac ecstasy (Rausch) that Nietzsche found in 
Attic tragedy. The intense vitality and enthusiasm shared by the people in 
Philippine religious festivals, as recounted in the scholarly literature, parallel 
Nietzsche’s point on the transformative and rehabilitative power of Dionysiac 
rapture. As Marsden explains:
In the overwhelming and entrancing ecstasies of Dionysiac rapture, life 
differentiates itself transversally. Unlike Apolline rapture, which concentrates 
and proliferates forms of itself, Dionysiac rapture is trans-formative, both in 
the sense that it is a destructive, metamorphic power and in the sense that it 
seems to migrate between forms. Nietzsche suggests that Dionysiac ecstasy 
43For a comprehensive account of personal interviews with Black Nazarene devotees, see 
Teresita Obusan, Mystic or Mistake: Exploring Filipino Mysticism in Quiapo (Quezon City: 
Institute of Spirituality in Asia, 2008).
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impacts as a “mystic feeling of oneness”, a reconciliation with nature, but this 
sense of oneness is strangely non-unifying. Dionysiac ecstasy names a nomadic 
ubiquity . . . .44
It may be said that participation in these religious festivities allows a person 
to transcend the fear of self-destruction and the correlative drive towards 
self-preservation for a chance at rebirth and absolution. The Apollinian 
illusion of individuation (“I have sinned. I am unworthy”) succumbs to the 
overwhelming power of Dionysiac rapture (“We are all sinners. We are all 
unworthy”). In this contagion of spiritual fervor, one forgets and remembers 
at the same time. One forgets his loneliness in the face of condemnation and 
remembers his oneness with those who seek redemption. This unhistorical 
disposition, as Nietzsche explains, is an “art and power of forgetting.”45
Viewed from this perspective, Philippine religious festivities may be seen 
as grounded in the Dionysiac. They are celebrations that commemorate not 
only one’s personal connection to the divine; more essentially perhaps, they are 
festivals that venerate man’s primordial union with everyone and everything, 
with both the sacred and the profane. The dream of severance, of absolute 
individuation is an illusion. It is a fantasy grounded in the social and cultural 
insecurities bequeathed to us by a view of history which underestimates the 
value of forgetfulness, which effectively makes us believe that reason and 
reflexivity are the only paths to authentic selfhood. Placed within this context, 
it seems that Nietzsche and religion (at least Philippine folk religiosity) have 
more things in common than we think.
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